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The book Battling Corruption in America’s Public Schools by Segal (2004) is well 
written, easy to read, very interesting and provocative, and offers to the reader a wealth of 
detailed information of corrupt cases in the system of public schooling as well as an overview of 
corrupt practices overall. The major contribution of the book is in its description of corruption 
and unsuccessful actions to prevent it as well as prescriptions that in the author’s opinion may 
help fight corruption. This makes the book groundbreaking research in the field of educational 
corruption, and corruption in public secondary education in particular. However, the book cannot 
be viewed as a revolutionary work. It is explained first of all by the absence of theoretical and 
methodological contributions to the interdisciplinary field of corruption, as well as by the lack of 
sophisticated theoretical lenses and frameworks applied in researching the topic. It is obvious 
that deeper theoretical developments are needed. 
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Structure and object of the research 
Our approach 
A traditional approach in reviewing such a nontraditional work would be to confirm the 
facts of misconduct in the system of public secondary education, presented by the author, and 
approve or criticize the prescriptions, i.e. political recommendations on how corruption should 
be dealt with. We take a different approach. Our approach is based on the fact that the book 
offers us a wealth of factual material on different forms of corrupt activities in the system. 
Consequently, we intend to apply and, as may be necessary, revise the methodological grounds 
as well as the methods of investigating corruption.  We are more interested in deriving our own 
prescriptions and policy recommendations on battling corruption, rather than focusing 
exclusively on the analysis of the prescriptions, proposed by the author.  We also utilize 
economic perspective, including microeconomics, principal-agent theory, structuralistic, rational 
behavior and networking approaches in analyzing building blocks of the research. 
Object of the investigation 
The book addresses corruption in the education industry on a macro level and in the 
school as a productive unit of the system on the micro level, rather than the process of education 
itself on macro and micro levels. Accordingly, the title of the book could be “Battling corruption 
in America’s public schools industry,” with emphasis on the last word. The author approves such 
an approach by stating that systemic fraud almost never takes place in instruction, and so the 
major focus should be on noninstructional activities (Segal, 2004, p. 19). We would like to pose 
two reservations in this regard. First, the fact that fraud is not frequently detected in instruction 
(as the author herself admits) does not necessarily mean that it is almost nonexistent in this core 
area of public schooling. It would be useful in this regard to discover some possible grounds for 
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corrupt activities in instruction, such as grade inflation, bribery, misconduct, racial 
discrimination, unfair treatment of students etc. We are certain there would be plenty of these if 
properly investigated. Second, fraud alone does not describe corruption in its entirety. Corruption 
in education is not limited to abuse of public funds and public property. Fraud is just one of the 
forms of corruption and may be not the major one. To summarize, school bureaucracies, 
maintenance, and auxiliary enterprises are not the lone grounds for fraud. While administrative 
corruption is visual or at least traceable through the financial audit and other mechanisms of 
identification, educational corruption is often difficult to specify, identify, and measure. 
Structure of the book 
Part 1 of the book gives a description of the system of public schools in general and the 
three largest school districts in the country, including New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago 
school districts, and describes numerous cases of corruption that have taken place in these 
districts for years and even decades. The author states that corruption in public schools is not 
universal but rather limited to large school districts and especially inner city schools. She offers 
some definitions of corruption and presents her view on other forms of abuse, including gross 
waste: 
“Much of what is wrong with the three largest districts is not criminal or illegal. Rather it 
is abusive and grossly wasteful. Abuse is conduct that deliberately or recklessly advances 
a group’s or individual’s personal interests at the expense of the agency’s primary formal 
goals. Gross waste is the obvious overpaying of items that are obviously unnecessary… 
In fact, abuse should and probably would be illegal if it were not sanitized by collective 
bargaining agreements, arbitration decisions, district policy and practice, and poorly 
drafted laws.” (Segal, 2004, p. 15) 
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The author builds extensively on the organizational theory. 
The second part of the book presents an historical perspective of corruption in public 
schools in the large cities. Such a chronology is helpful in following the changes in legislation 
and attempts of the authorities to curb corruption. It shows that the problem itself was recognized 
decades ago and that numerous attempts have been made to reduce or prevent corruption in 
public schools. As the author indicates, these attempts were mostly unsuccessful due to their 
partiality, incompleteness, and lack of understanding of the problem as well as organizational 
resistance. Here Segal emphasizes the importance of accountability in top-down authoritative 
relations. She distinguishes compliance accountability, performance accountability, and political 
accountability. Compliance accountability controls for inputs and their utilization, performance 
accountability controls for output and outcome, and political accountability includes, among 
other things, transparency and public scrutiny. Based on such a concept of tripartite 
accountability, borrowed from Ouchi (1995), the author gives the priority to performance 
accountability, as it controls for the productiveness of the system. 
In the third part, the author develops an argument about complexity of the system and 
why the system is not working properly. She criticizes the monolithic structure of the system 
with its highly bureaucratized and slow mode of decision making. 
Parts four and five present both the “wrong medication” applied and the “right 
prescription” to deal with the problem of corruption. Most emphasis is on decentralization and 
the empowerment of school principals. Custodians are presented as one of the major evils in the 
system, corrupting the system itself and preventing the development of teaching and learning. 
System restructuring is presented as a stem for possible future organizational reform. 
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Corruption as decease 
The parallel between corruption and disease is also appearing to be very interesting. The 
author makes two lines in naming the chapters. First, there is a general medical terminology used 
in the text, while the other line discloses the meaning of these terms as applied to problems in 
education. We can present this duality, taken from the table of contents, as the following: 
• The pathology 
• The remedies tried 
• The diagnosis 
• The wrong medication 
• The prescription 
The second line is presented as the following: 
• Laying the record bare 
• The frenzied search for accountability 
• Getting to the root causes 
• How not to fix the problem 
• How to fix the problem 
These two lines perfectly correspond with one another. At the same time one may notice 
that the “medical” line is not necessarily perfectly consequential. For instance, diagnosis follows 
the remedies tried, while it might be vice versa. More importantly, there is no strong link 
between prescription and diagnosis. 
Comparative perspective 
The author prizes the academic achievements of some other developed nations and at the 
same time calls for a decentralized system of public education in the U.S. This comparison and 
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recommendation lead to several questions, of which some would be: 1) Do these other developed 
nations have decentralized systems of public secondary education? 2) What is the level of 
corruption in these systems? 3) Are the officials, managers, administrators, and other bureaucrats, 
who run the system of public education in these countries elected (by analogy with the 
educational boards in the U.S.), or are they appointed, lets say, by the Ministry of Education? 
The author does not answer these questions, which are of key importance for any serious 
comparative analysis. As far as we are concerned, the developed countries of Western Europe 
and Central and Eastern Europe, including the former Soviet Bloc, (where academic 
achievements of pupils in secondary education might be higher than of their peers in the U.S.) 
traditionally have centralized systems of public secondary education with a strong vertical axis 
of power; and the officials in these systems are appointed directly by the top governing bodies, 
rather than elected, at least in some of these countries. 
Historical perspective 
The author gives a good historical overview of the problem of corruption in the three 
school districts, illustrated with many facts and comments. In our view, it might be beneficial for 
the author to attempt classifying the history of the districts onto certain periods, depending upon 
changes in legislation and in the system overall. This would be absolutely feasible since the 
author uses extensively a chronology of legislative changes in school governance and 
management. 
 
Method 
First, the author shows evidence of corruption, its scale and scope, indicating the 
significance of the problem. Second, the author identifies necessary preconditions or the grounds 
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for corruption to exist, including the scale and scope of the system, the intensity of monetary 
transactions, and the complexity of the system, including its net of horizontal and vertical, as 
well as formal and informal relations. 
Necessary grounds or base for corruption 
The author describes several grounds for corruption, including size of the system, funds 
used in the system, intensity of monetary transactions, and complexity of the system.  
Size of the system 
The author gives a good outlook on the scale of the K-12 industry in the three districts, 
using recent numbers. Referring to the work of Ouchi and Segal (2003), the author notes the 
following: 
“New York City, the largest school system in the country, has over 1.1 million students, a 
budget of over $13 billion, over 1,200 schools, and 140,000 employees. Los Angeles is 
the second largest, with three-quarters of a million pupils, a $7 billion budget, 900 
schools, and 80,000 employees. Chicago, the third largest, has half a million students, a 
$3.5 billion budget, 600 schools, and 45,000 employees. The operating budgets of the 
New York City and Chicago school districts are each bigger than the entire amount most 
states spend on education.” (Segal, 2004, p. 5) 
Number of employees seems to be proportionate to the size of the budget, number of 
schools and number of children in each of the school districts. 
Monetary grounds 
Describing the size of the school system in New York City, the author gives the 
following illustration: 
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“The system owns more square footage than any agency in the nation after the U.S. 
Department of Defense and the U.S. Post Office. It receives 45,000 work orders a year 
that range from requests to “build a new floor” to requests to “fix the toilet.” With 74 
percent of its students eligible for free or reduced lunches under federal law, it is the 
second-largest food provider in the country after the U.S. Army. It delivers over 850,000 
meals a day during the school year and 300,000 a day in the summer at a cost of over 
$250 million a year.” (Segal, 2004, p. 5) 
It is important to notice that the author explicitly states that annual budgets in billions of 
dollars constitute a money base for corruption: “With so much money flowing through the 
schools, the amount they can potentially lose to fraud or questionable billing is significant.” 
(Segal, 2004, p. 8) Substantial amounts of money or a large material base of the system along 
with intensive monetary transactions constitute one of the essential grounds for corruption. The 
author states that procurement fraud is one of the prevalent forms of corruption in New York 
City (p. 112). 
Preconditions for corruption 
Complexity of the system 
Another ground for corruption may be identified as the complexity of the system. 
Corruption can only exist in complex systems, unless it is formally or informally approved by the 
state. The book addresses the issue of complexity by pointing out the organizational structure of 
the system as well as its extremely complex net of formal and informal interrelations in both 
horizontal and vertical dimensions. 
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The organizational complexity of the system is well illustrated by the diagrams 1 through 
4, which depict Organizational charts of the New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago Boards 
of education (Segal, 2004, p. 46-49). 
Organizational complexity also contributes to the difficulty of proper oversight and 
control. These may become very costly with the rising complexity of organizations and their 
enlargement. Inflexibility and institutional rigidity of public institutions in particular make once 
effective systems of oversight and control outdated, ineffective, and cumbersome. The author 
captures this important point by noticing that: “After decades of accumulating top-down controls, 
most large urban districts today have no idea which ones, if any, are working as intended. Most 
districts have no clue whether their oversight structures cost more than they benefit. They do not 
seriously search for alternative, cheaper, more effective oversight mechanisms. Once rules are on 
the books, they tend to stay there.” (Segal, 2004, p. 74) 
Legal system 
Presence of the legal system that regulates public education, including its governance, 
management, finance, procurement and disbursement and many other legal aspects is a 
precondition for corruption. This statement is based on the concept of legal responsibility which 
anticipates that corruption is an illegal act. Simply put, if there would be no legal regulations for 
the industry, there would be no corruption. This approach comes from the four-level frame of 
legal responsibility, economic responsibility, social responsibility, and ethical responsibility. 
Conditions for corruption 
Among the necessary conditions for corruption we would highlight two, namely 
imperfect legal system and imperfect market. 
Imperfect legal system 
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An imperfect legal system in its broad understanding, including rules and regulations; 
and law enforcement creates opportunities for certain groups and individuals to advance their 
interests at the expense of the public. An imperfect legal system, the lack or complexity of rules 
and regulations, a malfunctioning of bureaucratic mechanisms, and the lack or corruptness of the 
law enforcement agencies leave some space for public officials to abuse their positions in order 
to pursue personal benefits that contradict laws and regulations in the public sector as well as 
private sector. This statement supports the finding of Segal (2004) about such problems as 
overspecification of money, tight bureaucratic control, numerous rules and regulations, which 
often contradict each other, their interpretation in personal interests, lack of performance 
accountability and control. Along with the line of thesis—antithesis—synthesis, corruption is a 
denial of the legal system, and in combination it leads to development of formal and informal 
rules and regulations. 
Imperfect market 
The idea of an imperfect market as a necessary condition comes from the key theoretical 
problem of the possibility of coexistence of public and private sectors in a given market 
economy and the degree to which abuse, or corruption, in such systems can be minimized. 
Socially complex societies historically maintain a large public sector. At the same time the 
presence of a public sector results in abuse of public funds that often occur from the side of the 
private sector. Accordingly, the concept of corruption as a result of an imperfect market 
anticipates that any economic activity that does not go in line with the natural laws of the market 
is subject to corruption. 
In some societies the predominant form of corruption may be embezzlement, while in 
others it may be kickbacks and bribes. The former USSR was an excellent example of large scale 
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embezzlement and fraud, based on the state ownership of enterprises and the entire national 
economy being a public sector. Many African countries are a good example of kickbacks and 
bribes. Svensson notices that: “All of the countries with the highest levels of corruption are 
developing or transition countries. Strikingly, many are governed, or have recently been 
governed, by socialist governments.” (Svensson, 2005, p. 24) 
Rose-Ackerman (1978, p. 2) suggests that any intrusion of the government in a market 
system results in potential abuse and corruption. The public school industry is a part of the public 
sector of the national economy, governed, funded, and regulated by the government and so is 
constantly under threat of corruption and erosion of common values, developed and accepted 
within the society. The author presents an excellent set of data, where such a nexus of public and 
private sectors goes along with the intensity and volume of monetary transactions as a base for 
corruption: “The Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) pays about $80 million a year to 
just six bus companies to transport pupil…. The New York City school system spends $2 billion 
a year on supplies, over $60 million on textbooks, $40 million on leases, $300 million on private 
preschool vendors, and, in 2000, $18 million to train parent lead school leadership teams.” (Segal, 
2004, p. 8) 
Controlling organs have investigated numerous abuses of the system: “In New York City, 
the FBI charged that the construction company had submitted $4.5 million in inflated school 
construction bills over five years. In the LAUSD, investigators charged that a single vendor hired 
to provide special education services had billed nearly $1.5 million in questionable costs. In 
Chicago, a single private provider of off-site special education instruction allegedly received 
$115,000 by falsifying attendance records.” (Segal, 2004, p. 8) Construction contracts with the 
large school districts are a lucrative business. One of New York construction contractors raked in 
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nearly $1 billion in contracts from 1959 to early 1990s. LAUSD invested $160 million in 1990s 
in construction of a single high school (p. 8). 
Evidence of corruption 
The book presents a wealth of evidence of corruption in the system of public secondary 
education in New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago school districts in particular. 
Quantitative approach 
Quantitative aspects of corruption include data on the oversight, abuse, gross waste, 
kickbacks, bribes, overpaid contractors, and advanced payments, with oversight being most 
innocent, to corruption related suicides and murders being most outrageous. 
Oversight often happens due to the inattentiveness of the school officials. As the author 
contests: “The LAUSD paid one company $14.3 million for a three-year telephone contract for 
nothing.” (p.8) Chicago public schools mistakenly overpaid employees $348,000 in 1991 alone. 
Bribes are often paid to school officials in advance in order to obtain contracts on everything 
from constructions to textbooks to school meals. 
Kickbacks are another widespread form of profiteering. Segal (2004) suggests that in 
New York City kickbacks often constitute 10 to 15 percent of the total sum of procurement, 
construction, and repair contracts. Following the problem of kickbacks the author highlights 
hierarchy in corrupt schemes and the fact that public officers on the upper steps of the 
hierarchical ladder gain the most out of corruption: “Upper-echelon officers have collected 
between $150,000 and $200,000 to approve phony bills; mid- to lover-level administrators, 
between $2,500 to $5,000 per contract; and low-level inspectors from $10 to $1000.” (p. 9) 
High stakes around the lucrative contracts sometimes result in suicides and homicides. 
Competing contractors and custodians become victims of targeted violence. The book presents 
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number of such cases that have occurred over the last decades and shows that all of the murders 
and suicides were linked to some suspicious contracts with the New York City school district 
officials (p. 10-11). 
Qualitative approach 
The author presents an excellent set of examples of a qualitative character to describe 
corruptness in the way the system is managed and operated. “One custodian brazenly announced 
to his principal shortly after he was transferred to her school that, since he had two other jobs, 
she should contact his secretary, not him, if she needed anything. Another custodian let his boiler 
operator store his gun collection near the lunchroom and live in the basement, where he slept, 
entertained women, and kept a dog. Yet another custodian used his school basement to rise 
chicken for cockfighting, telling inspectors that the hundreds of labeled eggs he was incubating 
there were to feed students.” (Segal, 2004, p. 147) The author characterizes such behavior as a 
deviant culture (p. 146). 
We also find it interesting that the author presents several passages where she uses 
analogies with medicine in defining corruption and describing corrupt practices. This may be 
considered as an original link between method and methodology utilized in the work. For 
instance, she notes: “The presence of employees out to swindle their district indicates a deep 
pathology akin to a disease like cancer, where the patient’s own cells attack him. The presence of 
employees who break rules to get their jobs done connotes a less serious condition akin to, say, 
boils, where the body is actually trying to protect itself by eliminating toxins through the skin.” 
(Segal, 2004, p. 14) Another example of using analogies with medicine would be the following 
passage: “As with the surgeon who cuts out a tumor but not the surrounding infected tissue, the 
disease will grow right back.” (Segal, 2004, p. 164) 
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Other examples may include: “Once the infection and surrounding tissue have been 
excised, the patient may seem fine. But unless his constitution and immune system are 
strengthened, it is just a matter of time before he gets sick again.” (Segal, 2004, p. 170) The 
authors also uses such terms as sclerotic process, while describing government’s culture of 
historical budgeting (Segal, 2004, p. 74) and more commonly used term of managerial paralysis 
(Segal, 2004, p. 86). 
 
Categorization 
The author draws different possible categorizations of corruption in organizations from 
the white-collar crime literature, including categorization by severity of the crime, type of crime, 
or operational function (Segal, 2004). She also establishes three categorizations that are in her 
opinion, unique for public schools. These include motive, legal vs. illegal, where corruption 
occurs, and intensity of corruption. 
Categorization based on motive anticipates corrupt activities committed in self interest 
versus corrupt activities or misconduct committed for the good of the organization or common 
good. Legal vs. illegal approaches in categorizing corruption form three categories: corruption 
itself, as something illegal, plus abuse and waste. The latter two are not illegal, but still harmful 
for the common good. The third identifying characteristic for corruption is where it occurs. The 
two major categories include instruction and noninstructional areas. The author notes that 
systemic fraud hardly occurs in instruction. Instead it effects noncore areas, such as 
transportation, construction, adult education, building maintenance etc, and that the highest 
incidence of corruption occurs among central, district, and school noninstructional personnel 
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(Segal, 2004, p. 18-19). A fourth way of categorization is based on intensity of corruption, i.e. 
density of cases that projects on either sporadic or systemic character of corruption. 
The author points out some differences between categories of misconduct, used in 
investigating corrupt practices. She notes that such categories as abuse and waste have a different 
meaning in respect to corruption per se. In her understanding: “Abuse is conduct that deliberately 
or recklessly advances a group’s or individual’s personal interests at the expense of the agency’s 
primary formal goals. Gross waste is the obvious overpaying for items that are necessary or the 
paying for items that are obviously unnecessary.” (Segal, 2004, p. 15) 
The author states that unlike corruption, abuse and gross waste are not illegal at the same 
time recognizing the fact that these two forms of misconduct may be as harmful to the system, as 
corrupt activities. We tend to consider such an approach as somewhat superficial. While we 
accept the difference between abuse and gross waste, we believe that these two types of 
misconduct have certain motives and carry functions that might be qualified as grounds for 
corruption. By this we mean that wasteful purchases of equipment are also done to benefit 
certain insiders and outsiders. This involves remuneration and should be considered an act of 
corruption. Here motive and hidden links become more important than the direct evidence, 
which is often lacking in studies that investigate corruption. This may well be explained by the 
specifics of the field and its relation to legality/illegality nexus. To the author’s credit we should 
note that the book suggests a possible illegality of abuse and gross waste and recognizes that this 
raises the problem of poor legislation and powerful lobbying groups, including trade unions and 
other political groups. 
To summarize, much of what is done in the public education industry is abusive and 
wasteful, but not illegal and does not constitute explicit acts of corruption. Abuse takes place 
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when an official puts his personal goals or interests ahead of institutional goals, while gross 
waste takes forms of overpayment and misallocation of allotted resources. Consequently, there 
are three categories to be considered: abuse, waste, and corruption. A major criterion for 
assigning activities to any of the three groups is the legality of the act. Such a categorization 
leads to the following duality. On the one hand, those who abuse the system based on their 
discretion while pursuing personal interests or benefits through embezzlement and distortion are 
considered wrongdoers, yet not explicitly corruptioners. On the other hand, those functioners, 
administrators, or bureaucrats, who commit acts of wrongdoing to get things done while 
pursuing public benefit, are not considered wrongdoers or corruptioners. In the latter case the 
rules might be broken, but the system presumably benefits from it. The two related questions that 
rise out of such approach are: 1) how do the functioners, administrators, bureaucrats, or teachers 
know what is better for the system? and 2) how do we know that what they do indeed, benefits 
the system? 
The answer on the first question, according to the author, is in local self-governance and 
the belief that the people who have their hands on the process, i.e. school principals, 
administrators, and teachers know the situation in their school better and can address the needs of 
the school at their workplace. The answer on the second question would be the assumption that 
the public accepts the idea of local self-governance in large-scale systems of public education. 
We are not convinced by this approach and would like to notice that while the former 
undermines the centralized nature of the system, the latter raises questions of professional 
competency and public accountability. 
The author suggests estimating corruption, waste, and abuse on the basis of intensity by 
raising the following question: “Are they opportunistic and occasional or systemic and chronic?” 
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(Segal, 2004) Referring to Ermann and Lundman (1978), the author admits that some sporadic, 
opportunistic fraud and waste is almost inevitable in any large organization, while noting that 
systemic patterns suggest a deeper, constitutional problem: “What is striking about the New 
York City, Los Angeles, and pre-1997 Chicago school districts is how systemic and persistent 
corruption, waste, and abuse have been in certain noncore areas. The intensity of the problem is 
such that… investigators unearthed the same kinds of schemes year after year, sometimes for 
decades.” (Segal, 2004, p. 19) 
To finalize, we do not consider the different approaches for a categorization of corruption 
presented in the white-collar crime literature as exhaustive; and, furthermore, we do not consider 
four approaches to categorizing corruption, including motive, legal vs. illegal, where corruption 
occurs, and intensity of corruption, as uniquely related to the public schools. Nor are the 
categories, drawn based on such approaches unique. These are categorizations often used in 
other areas of research on corruption, including development economics and public policy 
studies. 
Different authors use the word corruption in different contexts, expressing different 
meanings. The word comes from the Latin corruptio, which in Medieval Latin expressed a moral 
decay, wicked behavior, putridity, rottenness. It was consistent with the classical notion of 
corruption, comprising in the ancient Greece less the actions of individuals than the moral health 
of whole societies (Johnston, 1996, p. 322). The author should be given credit for capturing the 
essence of corruption in terms of corruptio, and differentiating between the two. She states that 
corruption in organizations and the behavior of employees leads to corruption in the functioning 
of the system, perverting educational purposes, i.e. negatively influencing processes of teaching 
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and learning.  This leads to the conversion of corruption as an illegal activity into corruptio as 
perversion of major purpose. 
Corruption in politics, public policy, and bureaucracies was addressed in works of 
Bardhan (1997), Benson (1978), Berg, Hahn, and Schmidhauser (1976), Buchanan (1980), 
Keller (1978), Krueger (1974), Moore (1992), Noonan (1983), Nye (1967),  Payne (1975), Peters 
and Welch (1978), Philip (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1978), Tirole (1992), and Weber (1978), to 
name but a few. 
Johnston says that not all behavior that breaks rules is corruption. “Corruption involves 
abuse of a public role or trust for the sake of some private benefit.” (Johnston, 1982, p. 4) Private 
benefit is a very broad term and may be understood differently depend on the context. Again the 
question arises whether abuse and gross waste are explicit corrupt activities or they are not. The 
author seems to be holding to the approach, presented by Johnston, i.e. considering private 
benefit as a necessary characteristic of corruption, whereas we tend to consider gross waste as an 
act of corruption as well. The key is that the benefit may not necessarily be explicit, visual, or 
clearly understood. It is often the case that the system of drawing benefits from what appears to 
be a gross waste is more complex than just direct kickbacks. Lucrative employment after 
retirement is one of the forms of such invisible kickbacks. Consulting, membership on the board, 
discounts, etc are all may well be kickbacks paid to reward gross waste. In fact, we are 
convinced that behind most of the cases of waste there is not just bureaucratic rigidity, low 
professionalism, or ignorance of the interests of the institution or the system overall, but a hidden 
interest and a private benefit. 
Leon contends that: “political corruption is a cooperative form of unsanctioned, usually 
condemned policy influence for some type of significant personal gain, in which the currency 
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could be economic, social, political, or ideological remuneration”, and concludes that political 
corruption is an integrated, systemic part of the American political process (Leon, 1993, p. 25). 
The same suggestion could probably be made for the system of public education in the US, and 
public schools in large school districts and inner-city schools in particular. 
In the modern economic literature, corruption is normally described in the area of the 
shadow economy and to a lesser extent in relations between the economy and different levels of 
bureaucracy and administration that are political organizations. A newer trend in research on 
corruption in developing countries is in presenting a descriptive analysis of perceptions of 
corruption by the population based on pools and surveys. The author does not rely upon a survey 
but collects her material from interviews, secretly recorded conversations, legal processes, 
confessions etc. This makes the material extremely valuable and of high degree of reliability. 
Nevertheless, it might be of benefit in the future to try developing and conducting surveys on the 
subject of corruption and corruptness of schools and governing organizations as well. This may 
lead to discoveries of corrupt activities in such areas, as core educational process, i.e. teaching 
and learning, which was left aside by the author. 
Education corruption is still not described theoretically. To estimate corruption in 
education is much more difficult than to estimate the shadow economy. The shadow economy in 
many countries is mostly legal in its process and becomes illegal at stages of different forms of 
realization. Products produced by the shadow economy are legal and do not differ from those 
produced legally, but avoiding taxation and illegal agreements make the sector a shadow 
economy. As follows from the facts, presented by Segal (2004) and estimations, corruption in 
public education alone is a multibillion industry. 
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One of the approaches is to consider corruption as illegal by its nature within any 
organization, even if it is broadly accepted and treated as normal. Corruption in many countries 
or large organizations is deeply rooted in the culture of the society and has a proud tradition. In 
historical perspective the concept of “feed from the service” is not new. When salaries were not 
paid for years, state or public serviceman collected their benefits from the public, developing 
clientele. Those were bribes in kind and rarely money. Embezzlement was a most common form 
of corruption in the countries with large public sector, including countries with planned 
economies and state ownership of enterprises, healthcare, and education (Osipian, 2007). Quite 
the same situation takes place in large school districts, where employees excuse their corruptness 
and embezzlement by the low salaries and suppliers and contractors justify inflated prices by 
delays in payments from the administration of school districts. While in small school districts 
and suburban schools corruption is not widespread and generally not tolerated by the public, in 
large school districts corruption simply becomes more sophisticated, concealed and difficult to 
investigate than it used to be, though still would be illegal. Involvement in illegal activities 
requires braking personal ethics and certain norms of behavior and establishing new type 
relations with the same and new people and organizations. That might be another reason why 
nepotism is flourishing. Not only “profitable” positions are distributed among the relatives, but 
relatives are less likely to turn in their corrupt colleague or supervisor. 
 
Building blocks 
Economic analysis, microeconomics 
The author uses intensively some economic tools in describing corrupt practices in the 
large school districts. These include overpayments, monopolization of certain rights and creation 
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of artificial monopolies, extortions from contractors, sharing in profits, profiteering, 
economically unjustifiable fixed rates on supplies, violations of conflict of interest rules, 
nepotism, including hiring of unqualified relatives, no-show family members, and ‘dead soles’ 
overtime, illegitimate charges, consulting fees, inflated bills for every kind of service and others. 
Commenting on the evolving privatization of educational services, Molnar (2005) notes 
that Chicago Public Schools spent $53 million in federal funds in 2004 to provide tutoring for 
80,000 students. About 40,000 students got tutoring from private firms, at an average cost of 
$1,300 per student, while the other 40,000 got tutoring from district teachers, at an average cost 
of $400 per student (Molnar, 2005, p. 128). Justification for such spending is often problematic, 
since there is normally no causality established between the amounts of money spent and the 
academic progress achieved, if at all. Molnar (2005) refers to the survey of the public school 
system, where “$200 to $300 million had been spent in supplemental services in the 19 districts 
with almost no scientific evidence that this spending has contributed to academic achievement.” 
(p. 130) The questions one might ask are: Should these activities and outcomes be considered as 
corruption or just overestimations and unmet expectations? Should more expensive private 
tutoring be considered as corruption with possible kickbacks to school administrators? These are 
the questions that should rise every time the problem of existing large public sector within the 
market system is concerned. 
Overpayment of contractors and suppliers causes inefficiencies as it happens in just about 
every large organization of such scale. Everyone tries to rob the government through the 
mechanisms of embezzlement from the public schools. Suppliers often become monopolists on 
the market of supplies for the school districts. This leads to higher prices as well as poor quality 
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of the products supplied. De facto legalization of such monopolies leads to institutionalized 
corruption as expressed in well-arranged schemes of contracts and payments. 
Extortions from contractors, practiced by some public officials, are based on the 
discretion of these officials over the distribution of lucrative contracts and supported by the low 
level of transparency, insufficient accuracy and control in procurement and disbursement, pre-
arranged unfair bidding processes and lack of access of competitors to the market of school 
contracts. This leads to lack of competition and overpricing. Anonymity as well as transparency 
may be suggested as the tools of improving competitiveness in bidding processes. Well-arranged 
system of sharing in illegal profits, systemic abuse of the conflict of interest regulations, 
nepotism, chronic overtime payments, and unjustified consulting fees all point to well-
institutionalized corruption in the school districts. As the author notices, even good corruption 
siphons money away from the system (Segal, 2004, p. 32). 
Considering the idea and practice of creating so called credit pools against “use it or lose 
it” rule of the center we would like to emphasize the following. Credit pool is not a replication of 
the central budget. It makes possible decomposition of the chain of payment in time. School asks 
for money first, then receives the money, places it into the credit pool, and then spends it when 
the time comes. Simply put, credit pool is about buying what you need when you need it. 
Another issue we would like to highlight is considering corruption as a right due to the low 
salary. This is quite common in every bureaucracy and according to the author widespread 
among custodians and maintenance staff. There are two major theoretical questions that can only 
be answered based on substantial empirical research. The first question is whether corruption, or 
more specifically, bribery, is a function of the recipient’s salary? The second question is whether 
the size of every bribe is a function of the size of the salary of the corrupt official, or a custodian, 
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or a maintenance worker? We would consider the institute of custodians as a number of positions 
established to indirectly embezzle from the government. They are an element of institutionalized 
corruption. 
The major difference in types of corruption between a planned system and a market 
system is in the following. In any planned economy with the state ownership of enterprises a 
major problem for just about every corruptioner is how to cash out from the system. The good 
example of it would be the former USSR, where embezzlement was the most prevailing form of 
corruption. The stolen products, however, were difficult to sell simply because there was no open 
market in the country. This undermined the very incentives to steal, except for personal 
consumption and distribution among close relatives, on whom the corruptioner could rely. In any 
market economy with a substantial public sector the major problem for a corruptioner is how to 
obtain from the system more money than was initially or legally allotted. This task appears to be 
somewhat easier than the one under the planned economy, and so one should potentially expect 
quite a significant scale of corruption in such systems as public school districts in the US. 
Nepotism is detrimental to the system for three major reasons. First, the people who get 
selected to occupy positions in education are not the most competitive ones. This results in lower 
quality of the service and lower productivity of the system. Second, supervisors are less likely to 
demand good performance of duties from their relatives-subordinates. This further diminishes 
effectiveness of such workers and negatively impacts productivity of the system. Finally, 
relatives are less likely to be turned in if involved in corrupt activities. Risk of being punished for 
involvement in corrupt activities decreases. As a result, level of corruption may increase 
dramatically. 
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Diffusion of local politicians and educators in pursuit of mutual interests and exchange of 
favors is based on coercion, favoritism, and anticipated penalties. Voting power of school 
constituencies is exchanged for present and future promised favors from the local politicians. 
Misuse of staff for one’s own or a friend’s political campaign illuminates the coercive nature of 
patronage and its demoralizing effect. Politization of schools broadens the ground for corruption. 
As noticed by the author, community run schools are corrupt as well (p. 120). 
It would be beneficial to address all of these issues with the usage of microeconomic 
techniques of analysis. Even though the author claims utilizing microeconomic theory, the 
evidence of it is hard to find in the book. 
Rational behavior and networking 
Issues of nepotism and diffusion of local politicians and educators, mentioned in the 
preceding section while considering possible applications of economic models and 
microeconomic analysis in particular, lead us to yet another building block focused on rational 
behavior and networking as a part of such behavior. Networking is an immanent part of an 
individual’s rational behavior whenever corrupt behavior is concerned. First, it substantiates 
level of security of corruptioner and minimizes his risks through informational exchange and 
informal early warning systems. Second, networking broadens his base and clientele.  
Primary structure of human organization is a net of relations, which occur among the 
people and groups, based on their interests. Ignorance and psychological vacuum are anti-
relations that indicate condition of the structure. Bolman and Deal (1997) note: “In 
organizations, as elsewhere in life, many of the greatest joys and most intense sorrows occur in 
relationships with other people.” (p. 144) Argyris and Schon (1974, 1996) argue that individuals’ 
behavior is controlled by personal theories for action: assumptions that inform and guide their 
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behavior. Bolman and Deal say that “These authors distinguish two kinds of theories. Espoused 
theories are the accounts that individuals provide whenever they try to describe, explain, or 
predict their behavior. Theories-in-use guide what people actually do. A theory-in-use is an 
implicit program or set of rules that specifies how to behave… Lurking in Model I is the core 
assumption that organizations are competitive, dangerous places where you have to look out for 
yourself or someone else will do you in. That assumption leads individuals to follow a 
predictable set of steps in their attempts to influence others.” (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p. 145) 
Corrupt networking might be especially well-developed and widespread in large 
organizations or systems. Here, intra-institutional as well as inter-institutional links are of equal 
significance. The evidence to it is close ties between the organizations along both vertical and 
horizontal axes of subordination, control, and cooperation that exist on individual level. Culture 
of corruption is yet another part of rational behavior and adhering to this culture might well be a 
necessary behavioral pattern for survival. Within the organization one should follow both formal 
and informal rules and respect the culture of the organization. For Schein (1985) “Culture is a 
pattern of basic assumptions – invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to 
cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.” (p. 495) In the system of public education 
and its underworld, described by Segal (2004), culture of corruption that includes “pass the 
buck” formula, hierarchies, informal networks, and even the lifestyle of the participants as well 
as their relations with the outside world are all part of corrupt human relations. It might be 
further predicted that stronger ties will develop between custodians, school principals, public 
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officials, external private contractors, and law enforcement to adopt and resist new anticorruption 
policies. 
Accountability 
Search for the prescription from the standpoint of both economic models and rational 
behavior and networking lead to the idea of accountability. Accountability may be approached 
from the positions of principal-agent theory. Principal-agent theory, first developed in economics 
to study relations between the owners of the enterprises and their managers, is now widely used 
in investigating numerous issues in public policy. Principal-agent problem can clearly be 
observed in the realm of corruption in education. 
Principal-agent problem in the fields of public policy and education is described by 
Banfield (1975), Becker and Stigler (1974), Darden (2002), Rose-Ackerman (1975, 1978, 1999), 
and a few other authors. McLendon (2003) states that: “In the context of bureaucratic politics, 
principal-agent theory posits two simultaneous conditions that are likely to conflict with one 
another. First, the relationship between principals and agents is said to be hierarchical in nature; 
to the extent possible, principals (elected officials) desire control over agents (bureaucrats), who 
are accountable to their elected principals. However, principals and agents are both self-
interested actors, so their preferences often diverge.” (p. 174) This agency problem not only 
urges principal to monitor the agent, but also to try different mechanisms of controlling his 
behavior. 
Agent abuses his position by getting involved in corruption and by encouraging his 
subordinates to do the same in order to blackmail them later. We suggest that the principal-agent 
problem should be investigated in regard of the concept of corruption and coercion in managing 
public schools. Describing collective corruption Gong (2003) says that its purpose is “to 
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maximize individual gains and/or minimize the risks associated with corrupt activities.” (p. 88) 
In fact, vertical hierarchy uses risk minimization as a tool for maximizing total benefits. Informal 
minimization of formal risks is an essential part of corruption and coercion scheme that works in 
public K-12 education industry. 
Fundamental problem of the principal-agent framework in approaching corrupt relations 
is that the principal, i.e. the highest in the hierarchy of authority, is not an agent, i.e. does not 
represent political will and interests of his constituents. Application of the principal-agent 
framework in the context of the corruption and coercion concept is truncated by this initial stage 
where central authority is an agent of the population. Agent becomes accountable to his principal 
not only on the formal level, but also and mostly on informal level. 
Presence of formal channels of power is explained by the two factors: 1) certain social 
constraints imposed on the members of the central authorities by the voters, and 2) by the 
necessity of legal coercive power to enforce mechanism of corruption and coercion. At the same 
time informal channels of power become predominant ones. 
The principal who cannot rely on population as a primary base of his power and formal 
authority requires from the agent both loyalty and compliance and expects from him to be 
helpful in getting public support. In exchange the agent gets both the informal authorization for 
the corrupt activities and cover-up from the principal. In this case principal is more concerned 
with personal fidelity of the agent and his willingness to share the benefits from corruption rather 
than with his performance of the formal duties. 
The author addresses the issue of accountability through consideration of compliance 
accountability and performance accountability.  Centralized control and compliance 
accountability in the three major school districts appears to be not up to the task of coping with 
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corruption. Overcentralization and tight controls undermine market forces in the industry. School 
officials should be given a right to choose prices and not vendors. This would be more in line 
with rational choice theory. The Weberian model suggests restricting employees’ discretion over 
contracts. As the author notices, scientific management implemented to stanch corruption, waste, 
and abuse is ineffective (p. 58). Corruption comes from fundamentals to which scientific 
management is superficial. This results in ineffective oversight, informational overload, 
inaccurate information, and opaqueness. There is a whole culture of “deny, defend and deflect.” 
(p. 72) Deviant cultures of corruption, illuminated by the language that uses such terms as “pass 
the buck,” “godfather”, “pieces,” and others are well presented in the book (pp. 122, 146). 
One of the major questions to be addressed is whether corrupt people create corrupt 
environments or people are drawn into corruption by either having material incentives, or being 
invited by the other members of corrupt networks, or simply forced to live by unwritten rules. 
We suppose that at the root of the answer to this question is rational behavior. If the system is 
corrupt it might be irrational for an incoming individual to stay away from benefits of being 
corrupt. Here culture is complemented by the purely rational approach of cost-benefit analysis, 
where benefits are obvious and costs are represented by certain risks. Addressing the issue of 
measuring effectiveness of massive oversight the author notices that the authorities “have no 
clue” whether cost of oversight is more than benefit from it, because corruption is hidden and 
difficult to measure (p. 74). Nevertheless, deterrent value of oversight is undeniable. 
In our view, a so called “aggravation tax”, charged by contractors because of slow 
payments is based on the absence of market rules rather than too much control. Advanced billing 
can not be regarded as good corruption. Abuse of the system by contractors is based on the 
concept of soft budget constraints, when initial construction cost doubles and triples before the 
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end of construction (see, for instance, Atkinson, 1994). Problem of soft budget constraints is 
common in public sector throughout the world. 
Prescription 
Pathology suggests the remedy, says Segal (2004, p. 119). She sees roots of fraud, waste, 
and mismanagement in command-and-control systems and offers a solution in form of 
decentralized discretion and balance between compliance accountability and performance 
accountability. Analogies with certain surgical procedures strengthen the argument. We find it 
quite a radical solution, which may be described in medical terms as the following: “if your 
extremity gives your pain, cut it off.” The suggestion is not to treat the system but to replace it. 
Moreover, corrupt individuals are very difficult to change, as well as the culture of corruption 
overall, due to institutional inertia and consistency of self interest. 
The author is moving away from structuralistic paradigm as an approach for resolving the 
problem of corruption. Corruption is often a product of the lack of clarity in structure of relations 
and coordination of activities. As Bolman and Deal (1997) state: “Structure provides clarity, 
predictability, and security. Formal roles prescribe duties and outline how work is to be 
performed. Policies and standard operating procedures synchronize diverse efforts into well-
coordinated programs. Formal distribution of authority lets everyone know who is in charge, 
when, and over what. Change undermines existing arrangements, creating ambiguity, confusion, 
and distrust. People no longer know what is expected or what to expect from others. Everyone 
may think someone else is in charge when in fact no one is.” (p. 324) 
Other suggestions brought by the author include transforming labor from union to 
incentives and performance, because unions stay for high fixed salaries and negatively influence 
quality, and delegation of authorities to informed units, where the unit is a school. In the author’s 
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view, the center should serve principals, not the other way around (p. 173). School principals 
should have independence in pursuing official goals. Roles of control should be delegated to 
independent inspectors general. 
We consider most of the suggestions, including dismissals, reorganization, changes of 
rules and regulations as administrative measures. Independence of inspectors and school 
principals is also not unequivocal. First, independent school principals will have more freedom 
to run the schools but equally more freedom of abusing the system on the local level. No one can 
guarantee that school principals will have much better intentions than do custodians. Second, 
whenever prescription for anticorruption campaigns includes the word independent, two 
questions come up: independent from whom and independent from what? There is always a 
public official or a politician over the independent inspector, and if the official is corrupt, it will 
be difficult for the inspector to perform his duties. Moreover, inspectors are not free from their 
self interest. They are as vulnerable to corruption as anyone else. This goes to the concept of 
controlling controllers or supervision of supervisors. History shows, that in many countries the 
largest bribe goes to someone whose duty is to make sure that there is no bribery in the system. 
Independency is a very arguable term. 
Even though the author tries to establish a link between poor academic performance of 
students in inner city schools and corruptness of the large school districts, we find it to be 
somewhat unconvincing. Moreover, there may be different types of links between the two, 
including moral decay as a result of corruption that might negatively impact academic 
performance. Even if such a link would be established, it would not be clear what causes what, 
i.e. whether corruption causes poor academic performance or poorly managed and funded 
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schools are a good ground for corruption. Absence of clear causality does not allow us to contest 
the presence of hard scientific evidence on such a link.  
The author attempts to justify the ignorance of certain rules by the school principals and 
teachers for the common good. She refers to Klitgaard’s statement that “if the prevailing system 
is bad, then corruption may be good.” (p. 35). Favor is given to creative noncompliance through 
the development of informal power networks. The goal of such networks is to put children first 
(p. 101). Teachers and principals often use semilegal methods to get around the bad rules. This 
creates bottleneck corruption in an attempt to overcome red tape, set by the central office. The 
problem we encounter here is the large degree of uncertainty about who knows better, teachers 
and principals or bureaucrats in the central offices. While teachers and principals see the 
situation at every workplace, they may be missing the larger picture and misunderstand general 
reform policies. We also consider the approach of “building relationships” (p. 102) as being one 
step away from corruption. As the author notices, bottleneck corruption degenerates into 
occupational corruption (p. 109). Journey around the red tape may lead to personal benefit. 
Honesty and enthusiasm of the employees as a guarantor is not good enough and will not last 
forever. In our view, any fundraising from parents should be strictly prohibited. 
Institutionalized corruption cannot be destroyed by scientific management only. 
Institutional corruption represents deeply rooted problem of trust or rather public distrust as well 
as culture of corruption. As mentioned in the book, participants of corrupt networks “perceived 
bribery as a normal” way of getting things done (Segal, 2004, p. 112) Presence of expediters 
indicates mediatorship as an essential element of institutionalized corruption. 
To summarize, the author sees roots of corruption in tight bureaucratic controls, detailed 
standards, rules, and regulations, and the overspecification of money (p. xxiii). Strong and free 
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principals along with Hayek’s information-based decision making are the key to success. Central 
allocation of resources, tight budgeting, based on history, lack of vital information, and top-down 
control are not good for the system. An informational vacuum is often deliberately organized by 
the leaders and managers for the simple reason of self preservation and fear of replacement, 
based on technical experience over complex rules (p. 104).  
However, establishment of the direct link between corruption and pupil performance as 
well as decentralization as a solution for the problem of corruption is not strong enough. This 
comes from the fact that rigorous theoretical frames were not fully applied in the research. As 
Gillette (2004) points out in review of the book “it has very little theory of substance and skips 
the difficult choices of applying theory in this context, especially for systems of this scale.” (p. 
303) 
 
Conclusion 
The book is well written, easy to read, very interesting and provocative, and offers to the 
reader a wealth of detailed information of corrupt cases in the system of public schooling as well 
as an overview of corrupt practices overall. The major contribution of the book is in its 
description of corruption and unsuccessful actions to prevent it as well as prescriptions that in the 
author’s opinion may help fight corruption. This makes the book groundbreaking research in the 
field of educational corruption, and corruption in public secondary education in particular. 
However, the book can not be viewed as a revolutionary work. It is explained first of all 
by the absence of theoretical and methodological contributions to the interdisciplinary field of 
corruption, as well as by the lack of sophisticated theoretical lenses and frameworks applied in 
researching the topic. It is obvious that deeper theoretical developments are needed. The book 
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does not bear any methodological novelty, clear definitions and operational categories, or new 
methods. Of three theories, explicitly announced by the author (p. xxiv), including theories of 
public administration, microeconomics, and white-collar crime, only the first and the third are 
used in the analysis. Microeconomic theories or approaches are absent. Moreover, the principal-
agent frame that might be of enormous use in analysis of complex organizations is used or 
mentioned only briefly. While most of the book focuses on explicit, well-documented cases of 
corruption, presented primarily by monetary transactions, the real economic analysis is missing. 
This leaves a space for further development of the issue with usage and elaborations of models of 
corrupt behavior. 
A mass of facts and materials is often allotted to different parts and chapters and adjusted 
to reflect titles of these chapters. At the same time the reader may find that facts in Chapter 3 are 
not much different from those presented in Chapter 5. Essence of the cases is often the same, but 
the chapters are different. 
While the book contains a good historical chronology of major changes in the sector of 
public secondary education, the genesis of the system, and more importantly, corrupt practices 
within the system, are presented weakly, without identifying stages and periods. 
A better comparative analysis would also strengthen the argument of the author about the 
necessity of decentralization. While the author uses some comparisons between the three districts, 
she does not include any international experiences with regulating public education and opposing 
corrupt practices. 
Most of the book is devoted to the consideration of corruption in school administration, 
supplies, maintenance, etc. and very little if anything at all is said about the core process, except 
for some influence of corruption on student performance. This link appears to be arguable. 
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Furthermore, the link between corruption and student performance is presented to make book 
more explicitly relevant to education as well as to add it soundness and a certain degree of 
political correctness. We find the link between description of the system and the problem and 
recommendations insufficient and not convincing enough. Issues of embezzlement, bribery in 
outside relations, politization, and informal influence leave aside possible corruption in the core 
of the system. 
We would disagree with Gillette’s (2004) observation that the research by Segal (2004) is 
based on anecdotal evidence. We think that the evidence of corruption per se is quite 
extraordinary for the field. Furthermore, we consider use of the numerous documented cases of 
corruption in the three school districts as an essential part of the method of induction, which 
often appears to be the most appropriate method in investigating corruption. However, the book 
often depicts a movie-type conspiracy and hunting for “small fish,” while the real theft is not 
captured. More importantly, the author does not conform to the method of induction along the 
structure of the book and does not theorize presented and otherwise convincing generalizations. 
The key theoretical problem that the author leaves unresolved may be formulated in the 
following question: Can the planned public sector coexist with the market without having a 
significant presence of corruption, abuse, and misconduct? While the work is about corruption, 
the theoretical frames used are those from K-12 and decentralized management, rather than 
theoretical frames on corruption. The author takes the evidence of corruption in education and 
suggests how to handle the problem. We would take evidence of corruption in education and try 
to build some theories of corruption, using this evidence as a good factual material. The book 
would be of high interest for both policymakers and theorists. While policymakers will 
appreciate a good description of corrupt activities and some of the prescriptions, given by the 
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author, theorists will find a wealth of material on which to build some concepts and theories of 
corruption. 
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